Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in principle offers unconditional security based on the laws of physics. Continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution has the potential for high-key-rate and low-cost implementations using standard telecom components. Despite tremendous theoretical and experimental progress in continuous variable quantum key distribution, the security has not been rigorously established for most current continuous variable quantum key distribution systems that have imperfections. Among the imperfections, intensity fluctuation is a significant principal problem affecting security. In this paper, we provide simple security proofs for continuous variable quantum key distribution systems with an intensity fluctuating sources. Specifically, depending on device assumptions in the source, the imperfect systems are divided into two cases for security proofs. Our proofs are simple to implement without any hardware adjustment for the current continuous variable quantum key distribution system. Besides, we show some compensation schemes for the decoding flaws for an outlook.
accessible or not to Alice, our security analysis of a QKD system can be generally divided into two cases given the two divice assumptions : Alice 1) can and 2)cannot monitor intensity fluctuations for every pulse.
In this work, we prove the security for the two cases based on different techniques. Particularly, in case 1) , because Alices information can help modify her data, the security proof is based on the integrating over the distribution of intensity fluctuation. Besides, a refined data analysis is straightforward to be developed to defend possible attacks based on intensity side information. In case (2), Alice can not exactly control signals for every pulse. Depending on whether Eve has the intensity side information, we divide the case (2) into two subcases (2A) and (2B). In subcase (2A), we prove the security based on a virtual implementation of classical data processing. In case (2B), we apply the concept of tagging, previous developed for DV QKD in [15] , to the case of CV QKD. Specifically, we divide up signals into two distinct sets, untagged and tagged. Untagged signals are those whose intensities fall inside a prescribed region whereas tagged signals are those whose intensities might fall outside the prescribed region. In the actual protocol, the QKD system users do not need to know whether each signal is tagged or untagged. They only need to be able to set a bound for untagged signals, which would lead to the security of their generated key. Moreover, given the distribution of intensities fluctuations, the users could obtain the probability of untagged signals and further optimize the fraction of untagged signals for the secret key rate. In the end, our proofs for all case (1) and (2) are simple to implement without any hardware adjustment for the current continuous variable quantum key distribution system. Alice and Bob can choose different security proofs to generate the secret key based on their device assumptions.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec.II, we explain our model for the intensity fluctuations. In Sec.III, we divide CVQKD systems into two cases based on different device assumptions in the source. In Sec.IV, we briefly review the secret key rate for an ideal CVQKD system. In Sec.V, we prove the security for case (1) and propose a refined data analysis to increase the maximum transmission distance. In Sec.VI, we divide the case (2) into two subcases (2A) and (2B). We prove the security of (2A) based on a virtal implementaion of classical data processing and (2B) based on untagged Gaussian states. In Sec.VII, we provide an outlook for decoding flaws of CV QKD system. We show some feasible countermeasures for the decoding flaws. In Sec.VIII, we provide concluding remarks.
II. INTENSITY FLUCTUATION MODEL
Here, we define our model for experimental intensity fluctuations. For example, suppose that a desired pulse intensity is I A , however, Alice actually prepares a state with the intensity of d * I A . We denote d as a random variable to characterize the intensity fluctuation, with mean value E d and variance V d . This intensity fluctuation can be caused by power fluctuations of a laser and imperfect intensity modulators [16] . In this paper, for simplicity, we assume the following conditions of the random variable d:
2) d has a mean value E d and a variance V d , where E d is 1.
3) d can be arbitrary distributed with the condition 1) and 2). 4) d is independent with the pulse intensity I A . 5) the probability distribution function of d can be obtained before the experiment by testing the source device. 6) the probability distribution function of d will not change during the QKD transmission. Here, these conditions are assumed to simplify our model for experimental intensity fluctuations. Conditions 1)-4) are the intrinsic constraints and assumptions for the intensity fluctuations. A strong hypothesis here is that condition 4), which could be violated when the intensities are very small. However, since in most current CV QKD system, optical attenuators are used to attenuate the strong pulse which is the output of the modulator. Therefore, the condition 4) can be guaranteed by these strong pulse. Conditions 5)-6) are the assumptions for system characterization, which is required before QKD transmission. Fig 1 shows two probability distribution functions (PDF) of d, such as Gaussian distribution and uniform distribution. Fig. 2 shows that, with the intensity fluctuation side information, QKD system can be divided into two cases for security proof. To fairly compare the results, an ideal CVQKD system is added as the baseline case (0) for benchmarks. Here, following [15] we introduce a hypothetical party Fred, who controls the intensity fluctuations d for every optical 
III. CV QKD SYSTEMS BASED ON INTENSITY FLUCTUATION SIDE INFORMATION

IV. SECURITY PROOF FOR CASE 0
Here, we briefly review the security proof for ideal CV QKD system. Because the security against coherent attacks can be reduced to that against collective attacks by using de Finetti representation theorem for infinite dimensions [17] , we only consider asymptotic security against collective attack for simplicity. Given reverse reconciliation communication, the asymptotic secret key rate is given by the Devetak-Winter fourlmula [18] [19] [20] :
where β is the reverse reconciliation efficiency, I AB is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and χ BE is the mutual Holevo information between Bob and Eve. Given parameter estimation of transmittance T and excess noise ε, the computation for I AB and χ BE can be found on the appendix.
V. SECURITY PROOF FOR CASE 1
In case (1), the security proof is based on two conclusions: a) strong superadditivity of secret key rate ; b) the central limit theorem.
Suppose Alice and Bob share n modes joint state ρ A1,2,...nB1,2,...n , and Alice has the intensity side information d k . The secret key rate for this joint state can be shown as
where P DF (d) is the probability distributing function of d.
In the first line, we use the superaddition of secret key rate from [21] . Then in second line, we argue that by the central limit theorem, the sum over all reduced modes converges to the average of its probability density function. Note that here in case (1), Alice has access to the intensity fluctuation values d and can further revise her data from X A to √ dX A for each pulse.
A. Improving the maximum transmission distance for case 1 by refined data analysis
In case (1), because Alice can obtain the intensity fluctuation information for each pulse, we propose that a simple refined data analysis can be adopted by Alice to improve the maximum distance and defend possible attack based on intensity fluctuation.
Here, we describe a refined data analysis process as below: (1)Based on the probability distribution function of d, Alice will divide d into a number of sets with equal probability. (2) Alice and Bob will perform the parameter estimation individually for each set, obtaining the channel transmittance and excess noise and verifying that if the channel transmittance matches with that from another set. This process is to defend any possible attack for Eve based on intensity fluctuation side information. (3) For certain sets, if the key rate will be zero or less than zero, Alice and Bob will simply drop all the data from such sets.
After refined data analysis, the secret key rate can be shown as
TABLE I: Evaluation parameters for GMCS QKD [18, 22] η ε c v el V A β 0.60 0.02 0.02 18 95.6 Fig 3 shows the simulation result for the secret key rate R 0 , R 1 and R 1R . We use the parameters listed in Table I , where η and v el are, respectively, the detection efficiency and electronic noise of homodyne detector, ε c is the excess noise in the channel, V A is the modulation variance and β is the reverse reconciliation efficiency. In Fig 3(a) , we choose the probability density function of d to be an uniform distribution from 0.9 to 1.1. In Fig 3 (b) , we choose the probability density function of d to be an uniform distribution from 0.8 to 1.2. Through simulation, we find that the secret key rate R 1 is approximately same as R 0 . By refined data analysis, the maximum transmission distance can be improved from 94km to 130km in Fig 3 (a) , while from 94 km to 199km in Fig 3(b) . This maximum transmission distance improvement is expectable, since the refined data analysis can be regarding as a pre-selection of optimal Gaussian states for long distance. demonstrated that both maximum transmission distances can be improved by refined data analysis.
VI. SECURITY PROOF FOR CASE 2
In case (2), Alice does not know the intensity fluctuation value d, and key rate integration such as Eq. (2)and Eq.(3) cannot be applied to the case (2) anymore. On the other hand, Eve can possibly have the intensity fluctuation side information and exploit a strategy to attack based on this side information and the possible refined data analysis is no longer applicable. Now the question arises: how to calculate the secret key rate when Alice cannot exactly control the intensity and has no intensity fluctuation side information fore each pulse? In the following section, we will first divide the case 2 into two subcases for security proof depending on whether Eve has the intensity side information.
A. Security proof for case (2A)
In this section, we consider the case (2A): Eve has no intensity side information. As shown in Fig 4, for each pulse, Alice also has no intensity side information and can only record the data X A . Therefore, a classical data processing to map √ dX A to X A can be virtually implemented by Alice. By considering reverse reconciliation, this classical processing will not affect Eve's information about Bob's measurement results. With the Bob's recording data X B , The secret key rate can be shown as
where I(X A ,X B ) is the mutual information between Alice's and Bob's classical recording data X A and X B , and
is the Holevo mutual information between Bob and Eve given the actual input pulse before the channel. Here, I(X A ,X B ) can be directly obtained from the data sets, while an upper bound for χ(
Here, we consider the case (2A) that Eve also has no intensity side information. Therefore, Eve can only manipulate in the channel. Due to intensity fluctuation, Alice will have a recording data mismatch, which we regard as a virtual classical data processing.
needed. Here, we use the fact that the Holevo information χ(
between Eve's and Bob's classical variables, is maximized when then the state ρ AB shared by Alice and Bob is Gaussian [21] . By calculating the mean value and variance of √ dX A , we can obtain the bound that
where X G A and X G B are, respectively, the Gaussian random variable with the same first and second moments as X A and X B .
B. the secret key rate for case 2A
In this section, we will estimate the equivalent transmittance T s and excess noise ε s for the virtual classical data processing in the source and then compute the secret key rate. According to the Appendix C, the equivalent T s and ε s can be expressed as
In addition to the channel transmittance T c and excess noise ε c , Alice and Bob would estimate an overall transmittance T and excess noise ε such that Fig 5 shows the secret key rate for case 2A. We still use the channel and detector parameters listed in Table I . In fig 5(a) , we compute the secret key rates for the uniform distributed intensity fluctuation. Even if the pulse intensity fluctuate 5%, the maximum transmission distance will still drop about 10km. In fig 5(b) , the secret key rates are obtained for the Gaussian distributed intensity fluctuation. The variances of Gaussian distribution vary from 0 to 10 −2 . When the variance increases to 10 −2 , the maximum transmission distance will decrease by about 40km. In other words, when the standard deviation for Gaussian distribution is 10%, the maximum transmission distance will drop a lot.
C. Security proof for case (2B)
In this section, we consider case (2B) that Eve has intensity side information. Before we jump into security proof, we firstly define the untagged Gaussian state. Here, we apply the concept of "tagging" [15] to the case of CV QKD. It is easy to verify that when Alice sends out a stronger pulse than what she is supposed to send, Alice and Bob will definitely overestimate the secret key rate by underestimating the channel loss and excess noise. Here, we define the untagged Gaussian states to be the output states from which Alice and Bob will not overestimate the secret key rate. As shown in Fig. 6 , the Gaussian states associated with d<1 are untagged.
FIG. 6:
Here, we apply untagged Gaussian states idea to the intensity fluctuation distribution.
Therefore, we can introduce an cutoff d max based on intensity fluctuation probability distribution function. As depicted in Fig 7, if Alice chooses a cutoff d max , the Gaussian states associated with lower intensities than d max I A would always be untagged. Then the probability to get untagged Gaussian states can be expressed as
Note that a modified QKD protocol is needed to implement an optimal cutoff for CVQKD. The modified protocol only requires different data recording process on the state preparation stage while maintaining the same output states. In other words, suppose Alice desires to encode X A and the actual encoding is √ dX A , Alice should always record the data as
Here, we apply a cutoff d max to increase the probability of untagged Gaussian states. rather than X A for each pulse. Here, we show the CVQKD system with untagged and tagged Gaussian states. In Fig 3 (a) , untagged states are always secure because we conservatively assume the attenuation from a virtual modeÂ 0 to a actual outputÂ 1 can be controlled by Eve. In Fig 3 (b) , tagged states are insecure if we consider the same attenuation mentioned before is controlled by Eve. Fig 8 shows the CVQKD system with untagged and tagged Gaussian states. In Fig 8(a) , an untagged Gaussian state is always secure for Alice. Here, we conservatively assume the attenuation from a stronger pulse A 0 to a weaker pulse A 1 can be controlled by Eve. In Fig 8(b) , for each tagged signals, Alice encodes in a stronger intensity than a threshold value, following GLLP security proof [15] , we conservatively assume that tagged signals are insecure. Therefore, we only consider the secret key rate extracted from untagged Gaussian state.
Suppose that a fraction p s of the pulse emitted by the source are untagged by Eve. The secret key for direct reconciliation can be extracted from untagged Gaussian state at asymptotic rate [15] 
The secret key for reverse reconciliation can be shown as 
Mathematically, it can be showed that Holevo information is monotonic increasing on the domain of d. Physically, when the input pulse has a stronger intensity, Eve can obtain more information about Alice's and Bob's recording results. Therefore, for the untagged states, the Holevo information can be bounded
χ A E,ps ≤p s χ A E , where χ A E and χ BE are the Holevo mutual information between Alice/Bob and Eve estimated from Alice's and Bob's recording results X A and X B .
D.
The secret key rate for case 2B
In this section, we will estimate the equivalent transmittance T s and excess noise ε s m. According to the Appendix C, the equivalent T s and ε s can be expressed as
In addition to the channel transmittance T c and excess noise ε c , Alice and Bob would estimate an overall transmittance T and excess noise ε such that For the secret key rate evaluation, we compare the secret key rates for two intensity fluctuation model: Gaussian distribution and uniform distribution. We still use the parameters in the table I. For the optimization, if we increase the d max , p s will be increased while T s will decrease. We try to optimize d max to get the maximum secret key rates. Fig 9 shows the key rate optimization results for the uniform distribution. Here, we consider the reverse reconciliation scheme. Compared to case 2A, the maximum transmission distance decreases faster due to intensity fluctuation. The maximum transmission distance will drop by about 20km even if the pulse intensity fluctuate 5%. Meanwhile, the optimal d max will always be the maximum value of its domain for uniform distribution. Here, we also consider the reverse reconciliation scheme. The maximum transmission distance decreases rapidly when the intensity fluctuation increase.
Compared to the case of uniform distribution, the optimal d max will be monotonic increasing as a function of distance. When comparing these two model for the secret key rate, we find that QKD with Gaussian distributed variation will have a lower key rate and transmission distance, since it always has a tail part for tagged Gaussian states.
VII. OUTLOOK FOR DECODING FLAWS OF CV QKD
In this section, we will introduce the detection stage for CV QKD. Especially, we will first briefly review the homodyne detection scheme for CV QKD, and then introduce three decoding flaws in the CV QKD system. For each flaw, we will propose feasible countermeasures and discuss the effect for CV QKD.
A. balanced homodyne detection
Here, we will firstly review the balanced homodyne detection. Fig 11 shows the homodyne detection to obtain the quadrature values of the signal mode. The signal mode (x s ,p s ) is combined with the local oscillator (LO) (x LO ,0) with a balanced beamsolitter, The local oscillator works as a phase reference of the system to measure the quadraturesx s orp s , i.e., applying a phase shift of 0 to measurex s and π/2 to measurep s . Suppose the phase shift is 0, the output modes 1,2 readx
(50:50)
FIG. 11:
Here, we show the homodyne detection. The signal mode is combined with the local oscillator by a balanced beamsplitter (ratio 50:50). The intensity differences between two output modes reveals the quadrature of the signal mode.
The intensities of the output modes 1,2 read
where the constant k contains all the prefactors in the photodiodes. The difference of two intensities reads
Because the local oscillator is classical and its intensity kx 2 LO can be measured without interruption, one can calculatê x s from the difference of the two measured intensities. Similarly, in order to measure the conjugate quadraturep s , one should apply a phase shift of π/2 to the local oscillator and follow the same progress.
B. incorrect beamsplitting ratio
In this section, we introduce one of the decoding flaws: incorrect beamsplitting ratio. In the perfect homodyne detecion, the beam spitter should have a balanced splitting ratio of 50:50. By checking the specifications of a regular fiber-based beamsplitter in [23], we find out the beamsplitting (coupling) ratio tolerance is ±1.5% for 1550 nm 50:50 coupler and ±6% for 480nm coupler. Here, we present the resulting homodyne detection results by unbalanced homodyne detector. Suppose beam splitter has a ratio of (50+δ):(50−δ) , Eq.(16) can be written aŝ
Now the intensity differences become
The detection result reads
Considering the factx LO >>x s , the detection result can be shown as
Now, we have established the relation between detection result and beamspliiting ratio deviation δ. If δ is a constant, the existing solution would be to include a variable attenuator in one output arm to balance the loss. However, this experimental-based compensation scheme requires the prior device characterization and increases the system complexity. By Eq. (23), we observe that the detected quadrature is a linear transformation of the input state's quadrature. Therefore, a straightforward software based countermeasure for constant beamsplitting ratio deviation is that Alice and Bob can rescale and displace their data to obtain x s =x s . On the other hand, If δ has a variance V δ , this beamsplitting ratio incorrectness will result in additional excess noise, V δx 2 LO /10000, in the detection stage, which will decrease the secret key rate of CV QKD system.
C. the wavelength-dependence of the splitting ratio
In this section, we introduce the wavelength-dependence of the splitting ratio. As shown in [24] , the wavelength dependence of beam splitter can possibly open loophole to the quantum key distribution system. However, the wavelength-dependence of the splitting ratio is quite small over a large band in the C-band. In other words, if Eve cannot change the signal wavelength, this possible loophole can be removed. A simple solution would be to add a 1550 nm narrow bandpass filter before the beamsplitters. Typical 1550 narrow bandpass filter has a pass bandwidth of 2 nm and a relative extinction ratio of 20 dB. Over this bandwidth, the effect of wavelength-dependence is less than typical measurement error.
D. incorrect phase value
In this section, we will introduce the incorrect phase value applied to the local oscillator. Suppose when Bob apply a phase of 0 to measure the quadrature x, an incorrect phase 0+θ is applied to the phase modulator. Given this incorrect phase value, Eq.(16) can be written aŝ
The intensity difference between two pulses can be shown as
Now the detection result can read
Therefore, a phase reamapping scheme [25] can be applied to the recorded input state. If the recorded input state is rotated by a same phase θ, the detection state now exactly match with the input state. This phase-remapping scheme in the reverse reconciliation of CV QKD can improve the mutual information between Alice and Bob so as to increase the secret key rate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have studied the security of CVQKD in the presence of intensity fluctuating sources. Generally, We divide current CVQKD systems into two cases for security proof. Depending on Alice's realistic assumptions for the devices, they might choose different security proof and obtain different secret key rates. In the case (1) , Alice can monitor the intensity fluctuation for each pulse. She can revise her data and obtain almost the same secret key rate as what she can obtain from the ideal CVQKD systems. Furthermore, by refined data analysis, the maximum transmission distance can be observably improved. In the case (2), depending on the devices assumptions, we also divide CVQKD systems into two subcases (2A) and (2B). In the case (2A), both Alice and Eve cannot obtain any intensity fluctuation information of each pulse. Here, we prove the security based on Alice's virtual implementation of classical data processing. Besides, in the reverse reconciliation scheme, this virtual classical data processing will not affect Eve's information about Bob's classical measurement results. In the case (2B), Eve could have the intensity fluctuation side information of each pulse while Alice cannot. Here, we apply the tagging idea from [15] . We divide the signals into tagged and untagged signals. The secret key will be only generated from untagged signals. After considering the total error correction cost and privacy amplification, the security of case (2B) can be proved. In summary, our work provides security proofs for CVQKD system with intensity fluctuating sources. Given different device assumptions, we develop different security proofs. For the most conservative case (2B), we prove the security based on the tagging idea. Our security proofs are simple to implement without any hardware adjustment for current CVQKD systems. Considering the realistic model, i.e.,Bob's detector is not accessible to the Eve, the mutual information I AB and χ BE has the form [18, 27] I AB = 1 2 log 2 V A +1+χ tot 1+χ tot (A3) 
Since the average E d =1, using Taylor expansion, we can obtain
Now, the equivalent transmittance can be shown as
Next, the equivalent excess noise ε s can be obtained from
Therefore,
Appendix C: equivalent transmittance and excess noise for a loosely controlled source
If Alice recording state is √ d max X A , the equivalent equivalent transmittance can be obtained according to Eq.(A2) 
